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Ties of Visegrád countries with East Asia – trade and investment1 
 
Andrea Éltető, Ágnes Szunomár2 
 
Abstract 
As a consequence of the European recession, interest of Central European firms has increased 
towards Asian markets. Trade and investment relations seem to have intensified between the four 
Visegrád countries and East Asia. This paper aims to analyse trends of foreign direct investment and the 
development, geographical and commodity structure of the mutual trade. Our paper also briefly outlines 
the economic policy of the given countries for the further development of Visegrád-Asian relations. 
The applied method is the statistical analysis of Eurostat and National Bank data as well as Chinese 
statistics. Our main findings are the following: first, trade between the Visegrád region and East Asia is 
largely influenced by multinational companies in global value chains; second, these networks have 
interlinked the two regions increasingly strongly in the past years; third, the pattern and intensity of 
connection to multinational networks vary among Visegrád countries. Based on these findings we 
propose an economic policy that – apart from the support of local small firms – considers the efficient 
participation in global value chains. 
JEL: F1, F23, F43 
Keywords: Visegrad countries, East Asia, trade relations, global value chains, foreign direct investment 
 
 
Framework of analysis 
During the transition Visegrád (V4) countries3 went through radical economic 
changes. These changes had been largely induced by foreign capital. Foreign 
multinationals realised significant investment projects in this region and established 
                                                 
1
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their own production networks. The integration of the Visegrád countries into the global 
value chains (GVCs) and the drastic changes in production structure since the late 1990s 
were generally proven by others (Rahman-Zhao, 2013, Timmer et al., 2012). Damijan et 
al. (2013) also concludes that inflow of FDI contributed significantly to the export 
restructuring of Central and Eastern European countries, but there are differences 
among countries. The Visegrád countries increased high-tech exports while the export of 
other countries is of lower technology level. An explanation for this can be the different 
degree of integration into the GVCs. Based on world input-output table data, Timmer et 
al. (2012) show that the use of imported intermediate inputs and the inclusion in global 
value chains have increased radically between 1995 and 2008 in the case of the Central 
and Eastern European countries. Stehrer and Stöllinger (2012) have similar results 
when analysing forty countries. The foreign value added content of exports can be a 
measure of vertical specialisation and GVC inclusion. Between 1995 and 2011 this 
foreign value added increased in almost all countries and, within the EU, Central 
European countries show a very high level (Figure1). 
Figure 1. Share of foreign value added in exports, 2011, % 
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Source: Stehrer-Stöllinger, 2012, p.9., based on WIOD database 
Based on these data Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are especially strongly 
linked to GVCs, but Poland to a lesser extent. Polish export structure is more dispersed 
and, in general, the effect of foreign multinational companies on export seems to be 
lower than in other CE countries. 
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Asia is another region of the world where economies are strongly integrated into 
GVCs. We have so far known quite little about the trade between Central European and 
Asian countries.4  There are, however, some papers dealing with this topic, like Éltető-
Toporowski (2013) and Ando and Kimura (2013). 
Éltető-Toporowski (2013) give detailed analysis of the trade between the Visegrád 
countries and Asian regions between 2000 and 2012. Applying detailed product 
classification, they find high geographic and product concentration and changing 
product specialisation of Visegrád countries towards Asian countries. Based on these, 
they conclude that the integration of V4 countries into the global value chains of 
multinational companies is also apparent in their trade with Asia. 
Ando and Kimura (2013) analyse the trade and production contacts between Asia and 
Europe via the Central European countries. They show that in the past 15 years the 
Visegrád region increasingly connects the two continents in three ways: First, due to the 
dominance of East Asia in the electronics industry, European multinationals have been 
importing electronic parts and components from their Asian affiliates and other Asian 
firms to use them for their production in the V4 region. Second, the automotive industry 
agglomerations in the V4 import machinery parts and components from Asia. Third, 
certain Asian firms themselves have invested in the V4 countries and intensified 
sourcing from Asia. These factors have resulted in tight production links between East 
Asia and Central Europe to serve the European market. 
Asia is a large and heterogeneous continent. Among the different Asian regions the 
highest trade increase took place with East Asia (mainly China) for all V4 countries. 
Therefore in the following we concentrate our analysis on Visegrád–East Asia5 economic 
relations, where China has a determinant role in trade and investment flows. We analyse 
these flows and furthermore, we assess certain effects of the international crisis. Finally 
we show the relevant economic policy promotion ambitions of the V4 governments - 
where they exist. 
                                                 
4 Economic contacts between China and the CEE region is described by Chen (2012). 
5
 East Asia comprises Hong Kong, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Macao, Mongolia, Taiwan. 
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Trade between the V4 and East Asia – the role of China in comparison 
The European Union has still a dominant role in the trade of the Visegrád countries. 
The share of Asian countries is much less, but their role has increased during the past 
years (Table 1). It is shown that for the V4 countries the weight of Asia is generally more 
significant in imports than in exports. The share of Asia in imports increased, except for 
Hungary, 
 
Table 1. Share of EU and Asia in the foreign trade of the Visegrád countries 
 EU 27 Asia 
 Export Import Export Import 
 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 
Czech 
Republic 
85.9 81.8 
 
75.2 
 
77.1 4.0 5.2 8.2 13.9 
Hungary 83.6 78.4 66.1 74.3 3.4 4.8 16.8 11.8 
Poland 81.2 76.8 
 
69.0 69.0 3.4 4.9 10.5 12.3 
Slovakia 89.8 83.9 70.2 75.8 1.8 3.9 5.7 12.4 
Source: calculations from Eurostat 
 
Table 2. Increase of export to the EU, non-EU regions and Asia (2000=1) 
Czech Republic 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Intra-EU 1 1.61 2.96 3.39 2.78 3.62 5.27 5.27 5.35 
Extra-EU 1 1.79 2.82 3.13 2.54 3.11 3.64 3.63 3.96 
Asia 1 1.50 2.73 2.98 2.82 3.67 4.98 5.01 5.41 
          
Hungary 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Intra-EU 1 1.51 2.93 3.22 2.53 3.29 3.92 3.83 3.60 
Extra-EU 1 1.45 2.15 2.26 1.84 2.18 2.40 2.44 2.56 
Asia 1 1.90 3.25 3.67 3.21 4.50 4.99 4.57 3.89 
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Poland 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Intra-EU 1 1.84 3.34 3.98 3.09 3.90 5.36 5.99 5.85 
Extra-EU 1 1.74 2.89 3.23 2.79 3.41 3.87 4.06 4.49 
Asia 1 1.50 2.76 3.60 3.44 3.97 5.57 6.39 6.81 
          
Slovakia 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Intra-EU 1 2.26 4.29 5.40 4.33 5.82 7.77 8.65 7.98 
Extra-EU 1 1.68 3.22 3.59 3.00 3.58 4.62 4.66 4.76 
Asia 1 1.85 4.14 5.17 4.70 6.98 9.67 11.99 11.10 
Note: Extra-EU contains Asia too 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
The most dynamic increase took place with East Asia, the share of which is dominant 
in V4-Asian trade, it gives above 70% in imports and generally around 40-45% in 
exports (except for Slovakia where it is around 70%, heavily concentrated on China). 
 
Table 3. Share of the main North Asian countries in Asian trade of V4 countries, 2014 
Export Hungary Czech Republic Poland Slovakia 
China 35.01 22.29 21.15 53.05 
Hong Kong 4.91 4.00 5.27 1.84 
Japan 10.11 11.16 6.19 3.95 
South Korea 5.86 6.59 4.76 4.10 
Import  Hungary Czech Republic Poland Slovakia 
China 53.47 44.61 51.90 32.38 
Hong Kong 0.57 7.85 1.01 0.44 
Japan 9.50 5.61 5.28 3.82 
South Korea 9.73 9.93 12.58 45.16 
Source: Eurostat Comext 
Table 3 shows the distribution of trade among the main East Asian partners. As seen 
above China has become the most important country of the region by far6. Other East 
Asian countries play smaller roles in the bilateral trade flows, although the share of 
South Korea is important in imports for the Visegrád countries (except for Hungary). 
                                                 
6 For Hungary, this has not always been the case, since Japan held the leading position in imports until 
2002 and in exports until 2004. The following years the share of Japan declined radically. 
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Czech imports from Hong Kong are also quite high. Exports to Japan are the most 
important also in the case of the Czech Republic, while Japan has the highest share in 
Hungarian import. North Korea, Mongolia and Macao also belong to East Asia, but there 
is almost no Visegrád trade with them. 
A common feature of V4 trade with East Asia is the considerable deficit that is present 
in every country (driven by the deficit with China). Poland as the largest country has the 
highest trade figures. The share of China is similarly important for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. An exception is Slovakia, because in its import from East Asia 
China has a rather small role (South Korea has a bigger role), but in its export the weight 
of China is outstandingly high. In the Slovakian trade balance the Chinese share is 
negligible. 
 
Commodity structure of trade 
All Visegrád countries export mainly machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) to 
East-Asia. In the case of the smaller V4 countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic) 
the machinery and transport export is above 70% within the total export, while in Polish 
exports the weight of this group has been smaller, around 25-50% in the past decade. 
There is a considerable share of other manufactured goods and food and livestock in the 
Polish exports. 
Observing the traded goods in more detail, concentration on certain product groups is 
generally high. The concentration indices calculated by Éltető-Toporowski (2013) show 
that the values of these indices are much higher (0.35-0.55) for the Visegrád-East-Asian 
countries’ trade than in the case of Visegrád trade with EU countries (around 0.11-0.15 
in general). However, there are differences in the degree of trade concentration among 
Visegrád countries: Slovakian trade seems to be the most concentrated and Polish trade 
relatively the least. It is also to note that concentration has increased considerably since 
2000. 
Not only has the degree of concentration changed over time, but significant structural 
changes have also taken place during the past decade. The results of Éltető-Toporowski 
(2013)  show that in almost all cases the main changes happened before the crisis, 
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export structures of 2000 – 2007 are much less similar than export structures of 2007 – 
2013. This means that the present trade structure had largely been developed before 
2007 between the V4 countries and their East Asian partners. 
 
Table 4. Share of high-tech products in Visegrád trade 
Asia Export Import 
  million euro % million euro  % 
Czech Republic 1495.54 23.5 5027.02 34.8 
Hungary 1469.11 31.3 4060.24 43.7 
Poland 878.61 11.8 3084.64 19.2 
Slovakia 111.84 4.0 2853.65 37.8 
East Asia Export Import 
 million euro % million euro  % 
Czech Republic 603.64 20.44 4452.31 41.90 
Hungary 472.61 20.20 3521.83 46.59 
Poland 350.34 11.08 2677.71 21.57 
Slovakia 39.03 2.07 2666.88 39.78 
EU+extra EU Export Import 
% Extra-EU EU Extra-EU EU 
Czech Republic 18.3 12.4 25.0 11.6 
Hungary 19.5 12.8 26.5 11.2 
Poland 8.4 5.9 10.4 10.1 
Slovakia 10.1 9.3 19.9 14.8 
 Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data for 2013 
  
Both increased concentration and structural changes resulted in the increase of high-
tech intensity of trade. The high tech export volume and share to Asia is the highest in 
the case of Hungary and quite high for the Czech Republic but low in the case of Poland 
and Slovakia. For the sake of comparison the table includes high-tech intensity of trade 
with the EU and non-EU countries too. It is seen in table 4 that the Visegrád-Asia trade is 
much more high-tech intensive than the Visegrád-EU trade. In the table we also give data 
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for East Asian trade separately. It shows that Asian high-tech import of V4 countries 
comes mainly from East Asia but V4 high-tech export goes elsewhere in Asia (like the 
United Arab Emirates, Israel, Kazakhstan). 
The high technology intensity of trade is mainly due to automotive, electronics and 
telecommunications products. This is based on the activity of multinational companies 
in the global production networks (see Ando-Kimura, 2013 as already mentioned).  It is 
even more obvious if we observe the most traded products closely.  Using the more 
detailed product classification of SITC 3 we calculated the shares of the first five product 
groups in the given Visegrád countries’ trade. Results are presented in the Annex table. 
This classification contains almost 300 product groups, but in several cases only one or 
two product types dominate in one group. The high concentration of trade is striking. 
The most extreme case is of Slovakia, where 73% of exports to East-Asia (China) are 
given by one group: motor cars.7 In Slovakian import “optical instruments” (LCD 
devices)8, telecom equipment and automotive parts have a dominant role. 
Hungarian exports are concentrated on “spark ignition piston engines”, imports are 
even more concentrated on “telecommunication equipment” (mobile phones and parts). 
In Polish imports electronic data processing machines, parts and telecommunication 
equipment have a large share but in exports ships, boats and meat have an important 
role. The dominant Polish export product to East Asia (China), however, is copper. 
Although this is a raw material, it is a base material for producing integrated circuits and 
electronic parts,9 the key components of electronic devices produced in GVCs. Thus, with 
                                                 
7 The most popular cars exported from Slovakia to China are the Audi Q7 and the Volkswagen Touareg. In 
2012 the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands was an advantage for the  
Slovakian industry. Because of the conflict, the Chinese boycotted Japanese vehicles and turned to German 
models instead. Volkswagen produces the three big sports models  which were in high demand in China:  
the Bratislava factory produces the VW Touareg and Audi Q7 models as well as the bodywork for the 
Porsche Cayenne (http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/2839471-china-and-japan-spat-
provides-work-slovaks). Furthermore, the Volkswagen plant in Slovakia also began exports of Skoda cars 
to China in 2013  and wants to reach  100,000 cars within 2 years 
(http://www.automotivelogisticsmagazine.com/intelligence/vws-european-exports-to-china-will-still-
grow). 
8 Samsung Electronics Slovakia has operated  in Galanta since 2002 and produces LCD TVs. It therefore 
imports liquid crystal devices (AMLCD) from South-Korea. Production is  continually modernised, and the 
Galanta company has become the largest manufacturing plant of Samsung in Europe.  In ten years it 
produced 60 million products and has invested more than € 350 million. Samsung and its suppliers 
employ around ten thousand people in the region, however this depends on the demand for TV sets. 
9 Europe's second biggest copper producer is the Polish KGHM Polska Miedź S.A. and  closely cooperates 
with Chinese Minmetals. 
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this base material Poland also participates in multinational networks, but in a lower, 
non-high-tech intensive level. The Czech exports are the least concentrated. In imports 
however “automatic data processing units” (laptops, notebooks) and 
“telecommunications equipment” (mobile phones and parts) dominate. 
These characteristics show that the bulk of foreign trade between Visegrád countries 
and East Asia has been and still can be bound to certain products and certain 
(multinational) companies. 
 
Asian direct investments in the Visegrád countries 
Although Visegrád countries differ in many respects, they have some common 
features as possible locations for far-east investors.  Their economies have been in the 
process of catching up over the last decades, their development paths are defined mainly 
by the global and European powers, rules and trends and FDI has a key role in the 
restructuring of these economies.  There was investment from East Asian countries in 
the V4 as early as the nineties (for example the Japanese Suzuki factory in Hungary). 
Most of these countries became increasingly interested in developing good relations, 
boosting trade relations with and attracting investments from East Asian economies, 
however, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 drew the attention of these countries 
more than ever to the potential of this economic relationship. 
Let us have an overview of national banks’ statistics on FDI from East Asian countries. 
Altogether in the four countries around 90 per cent of foreign investments are from 
Europe, while only an average of 7.4% of foreign capital comes from countries outside 
Europe, with the USA, the Republic of Korea, Japan and China being the most significant 
investors. Typically, equity capital and reinvested earnings represent the larger share of 
East Asian invested capital, while other forms are not that significant. The only 
exception is Poland, where the “other investment” category (meaning mainly 
intercompany loans) outnumbers equity capital and reinvested earnings in the case of 
Chinese and Japanese investments. 
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Table 5. FDI stock in the V4 from the main East Asian countries, 2012 (million EUR) 
 China Japan South Korea 
Czech Republic  -7.1 1058.1 1228 
Hungary  65.4 772.6 1047.7 
Slovakia 47.1 92.9 1899.1 
Poland 218.5 1093.1 625.8 
Source: national bank data in the case of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and OECD data in the 
case of Slovakia 
As table 5 shows, according to V4 national banks’ data South Korea has a dominant 
role in all countries except Poland; Japan is the largest East Asian investor in Poland, and 
the second largest in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia; while – based on these 
data – China is less significant. 
The role of Chinese capital in Visegrád countries, compared to all the invested capital, 
is still very small, but in the last few years this capital inflow has accelerated 
significantly and has also played an important role in the region's recovery from the 
crisis. In the case of the selected countries there has been a growing demand for 
attracting Chinese companies in the last two to five years. In Hungary this process began 
as far back as 2003. Figure 2 shows the Chinese FDI in V4 countries based on a Chinese 
data source. There is a discrepancy with the above mentioned V4 national data, 
especially in the case of Czech and Hungarian data. According to Chinese statistics, 
Chinese FDI in the Czech Republic started to increase from 2006 (in 2005 it was 1.38 
million USD, compared with 14.67 million USD in 2006) and reached 202 million USD in 
2012. The official statistics explain this huge increase with the recalculation of stock for 
2012 after adjustment of historical data, however, experts in the Czech Republic have no 
information on the components of this supposed growth. There is an inverse 
discrepancy in the case of Hungary as, according to Chinese data, the amount of Chinese  
investments reached 507 million USD by 2012. 
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Figure 2. China’s OFDI stock in Visegrád Countries, 2003-2012, (USD million) 
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Source: CEIC China Premium Database, 2012; MOFCOM 2013. 
 
According to the well-known theory of Dunning (1993), we can distinguish four kinds 
of motivations to invest abroad: market seeking, efficiency seeking, natural resource 
seeking and strategic asset seeking. A foreign direct investment has a market seeking 
motivation if it aims to supply the local market or markets in adjacent territories. It may 
represent a deeper involvement of the firm, following the success of exports, or the 
expansion of the firm to a new market. Transportation costs and government 
regulations can be good reasons for market seeking FDI. Following the firm’s clients in 
their foreign expansion, the need to adapt products to local conditions and tastes, or the 
reduction of transaction can also play a role. Efficiency seeking FDI has two main forms. 
First, firms often seek to increase their cost efficiency by transferring a part of 
production to low labour costs locations. The second type of efficiency seeking FDI 
corresponds to investment aimed at rationalising the operations of existing MNEs.  
Natural resource seeking FDI flows mainly in utilisation of location specific minerals, raw 
materials and agricultural products.  Firms increasingly use FDI to obtain tangible or 
intangible strategic assets that may be important to their long-term strategy but are not 
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available at home. This is a strategic asset seeking motive. FDI may be a tool to build the 
ownership advantages that will support the firm’s expansion at home and abroad. 
When searching for possible attractive factors of the region for East Asian investors, 
we should keep in mind that labour costs are lower in the Visegrád region than the EU 
average, although there are differences within the region as well. The V4 workforce is 
also considered to be skilled compared to other CEE countries. Concerning market size, 
Poland is the biggest market in terms of the size of population (38.1 million), while the 
others are medium-sized (10.5 million in the Czech Republic, 9.9 million in Hungary) or 
small (5.4 million in Slovakia)10, although from the Chinese point of view all of them 
could be considered to be rather small. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are relatively 
affluent markets as well: based on Eurostat’s data on GDP per capita in purchasing 
power standards (PPS) – where EU28=100 – GDP per capita was highest in the Czech 
Republic (84), somewhat lower in the Slovak Republic (76) and relatively lower in 
Poland (68) and Hungary (68) in 201411. 
Using the mentioned motivation framework of Dunning, we can find examples of the 
four types in the case of East Asian investors. 
Concerning Japanese multinationals, Kawai (2006) analyzed motivations and 
locational determinants of investments in Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) and found that Japanese MNCs’ investments were motivated by relatively low 
labour and land costs and a well educated labour force necessary in manufacturing 
sectors. A large majority of Japanese FDI in CEECs was directed at the manufacturing 
sector, especially transport equipment and electronics (like Yazaki, Toyota, Suzuki, 
Sumitomo, Panasonic, Sony). Toyota built a joint venture factory (TPCA) with Peugeot in 
the Czech Republic in 2001 (producing from 2005) and opened a transmission factory in 
Poland during the same year and an engine factory in 2005, that supplies TPCA. TPCA 
produced 203000 cars in 2014 that were sold in the EU-countries. In the first half of 
2015 production was 38% more than one year before in the same period. .12. Several 
Japanese investors in the V4 manufacturing sector preferred countries with lower 
corporate tax and a high rate of GDP growth. Thus, overall, Japanese FDI in CEECs is 
                                                 
10 Eurostat, data, 2014 
11 Eurostat data, 2014 
12 http://www.praguepost.com/economy/48720-tpca-increased-production-in-h1  
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characterized by efficiency-seeking and market-seeking motives (Kawai, 2006; McCaleb-
Szunomár, 2014). 
Access to EU markets was an important market-seeking factor (Woon, 2003). The 
very first big Japanese investment in the transition countries was of Suzuki in Hungary: 
in 1991 Magyar Suzuki Corporation was established and serial production of cars 
started in 1992. By July 2014 over 2.5 million cars had rolled off the assembly line. The 
main motivation here was to get behind “EU walls”, as Hungary had signed an 
association agreement in 1991 and had prospects for membership.  Suzuki continually 
invested in developing its factory, increased share of local supplies (in order to reach the 
local content level required for tariff-free exports to the European Union) and therefore 
was basically the only greenfield car producer in the region with high local content. 
South Korea has had similar motives when investing in the region. Among the first, 
being a risk-taker and market seeker, Daewoo established a basis in Poland in the 
automotive industry (purchasing the FSO factory) and in electronics. The large Korean 
producer exploited the opportunities of the Polish privatisation process when taking 
over FSO in 1996. Its suppliers later followed and also invested in Poland. Later, other 
South Korean car producers (Kia and Hyundai) made use of cheap labour and relatively 
good production conditions in the region and moved their development centres to the 
V4 to produce cars for European customers. The Hyundai Mobis plant is the third major 
South Korean investment project in the Czech Republic13.  The Hyundai car plant was 
built between 2006 and 2008. It essentially started its production in 2009 and is still 
following an increasing trend in output. It is one of the most advanced automotive 
factories in Europe. There is also a Nexen tyre factory planned in the north part of 
Czechia, the agreement was signed in June 2014 and building begins in 2015 autumn.14 
                                                 
13 In July 2014 the Czech  Prime Minister and the General Manager of Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd. signed an 
Investment Agreement about the construction of the company for production of headlamps in Mošnov. 
The planned investment is 4.2 billion CZK, including state incentives The construction of the company is 
planned for September 2015 offering around 6-900 jobs. http://www.mobis-
auto.cz/en/aktuality/140804.php  
14 South Korea’s Nexen Tire Corp. has committed to spending $1.1 billion to build a tire plant in Zatec, 
Czech Republic, that will have a capacity estimated at 6 million units annually with more than 1,000 
employees. The plant will be built on a 375-acre site in the Triangle Industrial Zone near Zatec, with 
construction to start in 2015. 
http://www.rubbernews.com/article/20140627/NEWS/140629958/south-koreas-nexen-tire-signs-
czech-plant-deal# 
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The plant will produce for EU market. In 2004 KIA Motors started to operate in Slovakia. 
It was the first manufacturing plant of this company in Europe. KIA Motors Slovakia 
employs 3 500 workers and produces five car models and also engines (ICEG, 2012). 
These heavily export-oriented investments had the aim of acquiring markets utilising a 
qualified labour force. 
Generally, Chinese investments can be characterized mainly by natural resource-
seeking, market-seeking (Buckley et al., 2007) and recently also by strategic asset-
seeking motives (Di Minin et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012). Considering the motivation of 
Chinese investments in the V4, the change of the institutional setting of Visegrád 
countries due to their economic integration into the EU has been the most important 
driver that has spurred Chinese FDI in the region, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
The majority of these firms that invested in the V4 countries after their EU accession 
were motivated mainly by accessing the old EU-15 markets, while local markets were of 
secondary importance (market-seeking). EU membership of the the V4 countries 
allowed Chinese investors to avoid trade barriers and the countries served as an 
assembly base due to the relatively low labour costs (efficiency–seeking, see McCaleb-
Szunomár, 2014). The main type of Chinese FDI thus in the region is market-seeking 
investment: by entering the Visegrád markets Chinese companies will have access not 
only to the EU market but also to markets of the CIS, the Mediterranean region and 
EFTA. However, parallel with the increasing number of mergers and acquisitions in the 
region, strategic asset-seeking motives have become more and more important for 
Chinese MNCs in recent years. 
Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors of the Visegrád 
countries. Initially, Chinese investment has flowed mostly into manufacturing 
(assembly), but over time services have attracted an increasing amount of investment as 
well15. The main Chinese investors targeting these four countries are interested 
primarily in telecommunication, electronics, the chemical industry and transportation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 For example, in Hungary and Poland there are branches of Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China as well as offices of some of the largest law offices in China, Yingke Law Firm (in Hungary in 
2010, in Poland in 2012), Dacheng Law Offices (in Poland in 2011, in Hungary in 2012). In Slovakia the 
Chinese Lenovo Group created a service centre in Bratislava. It was followed by Huawei and Mesnac, that 
has opened a research and technical centre aimed at designing and producing tyre  molding machines and 
spare parts (Szikorova, 2012) 
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Their investments are motivated by the seeking of brands, new technologies or market 
niches that they can fill in European markets. 
Describing Chinese investments in the CEE region, Jacoby (2014) observes that their 
characteristics differ somewhat from those in the EU. Among the three forms of FDI 
(greenfield investment, mergers & acquisitions and strategic alliances) we can find more 
greenfield projects and fewer strategic alliances from the Chinese side than in the EU. 
Characterising Asian investments and their motivation in the Visegrád region we 
have to mention the role of state subsidies and incentives. Especially before EU 
membership, but also afterwards, governments and local authorities applied sometimes 
tailor-made incentives to attract large investors. In the case of Hungary the so-called 
“customs free zones” were highly attractive for greenfield foreign investors (among 
them Asian ones) during the nineties. These export oriented automotive, electronics and 
other firms provided a huge share of foreign trade of the country. Poland and Slovakia 
too, provided corporate tax allowances and other incentives for foreign investors. The 
Czech government has also given subsidies, for example about €200 million in tax 
allowances and other investment incentives to draw Hyundai to a high unemployment 
region.  Similarly, TPCA16 was granted generous incentives from both the Czech state 
and from the town of Kolín, which paid for the complete development of the industrial 
zone, costs of traffic route extensions, sound barriers, new housing units and other 
adequate infrastructure.  As a result of all of this the town of Kolín is indebted until 2019 
(Guidote, 2008). The recently concluded agreements with Hyundai and Nexen have also 
included state incentives.17 
 
 
                                                 
16
 The company is situated in the industrial zone Kolín-Ovčáry with around 3500 employees. Eighty percent of 
all parts for cars are sourced in the Czech Republic. More than 100 supplying firms (about 60 of them Japanese 
and a similar number of them from Western Europe) followed TPCA to the Czech Republic to work also for 
other car factories. 
17 Under terms of the Nexen contract, the Czech state will provide investment incentives valued at a 
maximum of $190 million, according to the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Of this, $100 million 
represents tax relief on corporate income, $50 million will be for financial support in the framework of 
strategic investments, $15 million for job creation, $15 million from the Ústí region as a discount on the 
land and $4.5 million in financial support for training. 
http://www.tirebusiness.com/article/20140627/NEWS/140629917/nexen-settles-on-site-for-czech-
tire-plant  
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Box 1. Chinese FDI in Hungary 
Chinese investment in Hungary started to increase significantly after the country joined the EU in 
2004. In 2010, Hungary itself attracted 89% of the whole Chinese capital flow to the region (Chen, 
2012). By 2012, the amount of Chinese investments had further increased and reached 507 million 
USD (according to MOFCOM data), which is by far the highest in the region. Nevertheless, this amount 
is far greater when taking into account cumulative Hungarian data, since a significant portion of 
Chinese investment is received via intermediary countries or companies, therefore it appears 
elsewhere in Chinese statistics. According to Hungarian reports, Chinese investment in Hungary by 
2014 was more than 3 billion USD, which represent around 2-2.5% of Hungary’s total FDI stock. 
More than 1.5 billion USD from that is the investment of the Chinese chemical company Wanhua, 
which acquired a 96 per cent stake in the Hungarian chemical company BorsodChem through its 
Dutch subsidiary in 2010 and 2011 and later also invested in the development of BorsodChem. It is 
the largest Chinese investment in the CEE region so far.  
In Hungary, most of the significant Chinese TNCs operate in the manufacturing sector and have 
started to increase their investments in the last few years. Chinese TNCs have bought plants of other 
companies or replaced former partners of electronic manufacturing service providers. These 
investments have saved and/or created jobs and contributed to the economic growth of Hungary 
with their investments and exports during the crisis. Furthermore, many of them (e.g. Lenovo, ZTE, 
Huawei, Bank of China) have turned their Hungarian businesses into the European regional hub of 
their activities (Szunomár et al., 2014). 
Hungary’s importance as a regional distribution centre can also be observed in the field of trade. 
Some big retail and wholesale trade centres, as well as business matching centres in Budapest – e.g. 
Asia Center, China Brand Trade Center, Budapest Fashion Center, Budapest China Mart18 - support 
the distribution of different Chinese (or other Asian) products19 in the CEE region and also supply 
Hungarian customers. Besides retail, Chinese immigrants often operate restaurants in Hungary.  
In addition to manufacturing, the investment of Chinese companies in Hungary covers industries 
such as chemical industry, telecommunications, trade, wholesale and retail, banking, hotels and 
catering, logistics, real estate and consultancy, etc. According to the data of the Hungarian Investment 
and Trade Agency more than 5000 Chinese companies operate in Hungary, including several 
multinationals, but most of them are small businesses operating in the service or retail sector: 
restaurants, perfumeries, and so called ‘Chinese shops’, selling bargains that comprise everything 
from shoes and clothes to plastic toys. According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the 
number of Chinese-controlled foreign affiliates increased steadily between 2008 and 2010 and then 
decreased slightly in 2011.  
In addition to Wanhua, other major investors are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Lenovo, Sevenstar 
Electronics Co., BYD Electronics and Comlink. Concerning entry mode, there are examples of quasi-
greenfield20 investments (Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo), as well as M&As (Wanhua) and joint ventures 
(Orient Solar, BBCA). Another significant investment is the China Brand Trade Center (the 
investment of the Chinese company Genertec), which is a market platform for branded and 
competitive Chinese products and their suppliers. Typically, while Hungary would prefer greenfield 
investments (as they create jobs), in the past years Chinese investors tend to choose mergers and 
acquisitions and joint ventures when investing in Hungary. 
 
                                                 
18 Asia Center and China Brand Trade Center are owned by Strabag SE. Budapest Fashion Center and 
Budapest China Mart are owned by Chinese investors. 
19 e.g. entertainment electronics, household electronics, IT products, bags, gifts, crafts, accessories, 
jewellery, shoes, footwear, textile, home textile and garments, etc. 
20 Parent companies of Huawei, ZTE or Lenovo have not built up new operational facilities (as they chose 
the form of contract manufacturing) but created new long-term jobs by hiring new employees. 
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Crisis effects on trade and FDI 
The international crisis in 2008 had generally negative effects on global value chains. 
The big trade collapse in 2009 was made even worse by the general credit crunch.  
Global value chains are channels for the rapid transmission of both real and financial 
shocks. Demand drop for final goods can immediately affect flows of intermediates, 
especially when supplier contracts are short-term. Credit market problems can have a 
negative international chain effect through global value chains. (Milberg & Winkler, 
2010).  Although, supporting a contrary opinion, others (eg. Altomonte & Ottaviano, 
2009) point out that supply chains could have also been a factor of resilience in the 
crisis, as existing supply chains are difficult to abolish because of contractual 
arrangements and high initial sunk costs. 
Trade drop and quick recovery could have been caused by the effect of the crisis on 
GVC trade that is mentioned by several authors as the “bullwhip effect” (Escaith et al. 
2010, Altomonte et al. 2012, Zavacka 2012). This means that low demand expectations 
force lead firms to adjust by their inventories. After the crisis, if demand for the product 
is recovered, sold out inventories can be accumulated again, so trade increase can also 
be magnified by GVCs. Sass-Szalavetz (2014) reviews and sums up the empirical 
literature on the role of GVCs in the crisis and concludes that the results depend on the 
different approaches and different methodologies, datasets and time period. They also 
reinforce the twofold effects of GVCs: on the one hand transmitting and amplifying the 
crisis contributing to the decrease of international trade; on the other hand producing a 
stabilizing effect. This latter took place in a slightly longer run, attributed to the bullwhip 
effect and to the fact that companies inside the value chain helped each other by 
financing or network rebuilding. The bullwhip effect has been well manifested in the 
rebound of Visegrád-Asian trade too. 
The international crisis resulted in reorganisations and relocations of firms. Trade 
flows largely controlled by multinational companies and their production in the global 
production chains have been affected by the relocation decisions of these firms. 
Companies relocated to improve their competitiveness as a consequence of the crisis 
and this had both negative and positive effects on the trading countries. Hunya – Sass 
(2014) found increasing relocation activity to Hungary in the post-crisis years until 
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2011 and found evidence for re-shoring or back-shoring as well. Also, some additional 
investments have been relocated from Western Europe to Poland due to low cost 
seeking by multinationals (Éltető-Toporowski, 2013). On the other hand, relocation also 
took place from Hungary, decreasing the Hungarian export capacity significantly in 
2012-14. This relocation only favoured the East-Asian countries21. 
Automotive industry plants were hit Europe-wide by the crisis and it affected Asian-
owned firms in the Visegrád region too. The scrappage incentive programme introduced 
as an anti-crisis measure significantly helped the Czech TPCA company as it is focused 
on the production of small ecological cars, which were targeted by the scrappage.22 Mass 
production in the Hyundai factory was launched in November 2008, at the time of one of 
the most  ignificant impacts of the crisis in the Czech Republic., Hyundai generally 
suffered a big loss because of the economic crisis , but  figures for the Czech plant 
improved the following year. A three-shift system was introduced and the production 
capacity extended (Šerý, 2011). 
As a reaction to the global financial crisis the V4 countries started to search for new 
opportunities for their recovery from the recession. For example, Hungary's "Eastern 
Opening" policy was initiated after (and partly as a result of) the crisis. Accordingly, 
China  took these opportunities and have increased sectoral representation of Chinese 
firms in CEECs in recent years. Another reason for this higher representation could be a 
diversification strategy, because recently Chinese global investment strategy places 
great emphasis on diversification in all respects. 
 
Economic policy towards Asia in the Visegrád region 
In the case of Poland, the major objectives of economic policy are the expansion of 
exports to Asian markets, attracting FDI to Poland, and supporting Polish enterprises in 
their business interests in Asia. In recent years officials and experts have often called for 
                                                 
21 In 2012 Nokia downgraded its affiliate in Hungary, switched assembly to Nokia’s plants in South Korea 
and in Beijing. Therefore, in 2012 the  previously huge export of cellular phones from Hungary decreased. 
In 2014 Microsoft (the owner of Nokia Komárom) announced the closure of the firm. 
22 This enabled TPCA to hire about 100 new workers in 2009 and some extra shifts could be created. 
Therefore the company was able to produce about 8,400 vehicles more than in 2008. 
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a strategy in Polish foreign policy towards Asia. In the priorities of Polish foreign policy 
for 2012-2016, four Asian countries were identified as important in terms of developing 
bilateral relations: China, India, Japan and South Korea. These countries can have an 
important role not only in investments to Poland but also in developing commercial 
contacts in such sectors as infrastructure, finance, tourism and the creative industries. 
Poland has good connections with Japan and in 2014 the Polish government stated that 
it intends to raise relations to the strategic level.23 
China gained special interest in Polish foreign economic policy not only due to its 
huge market and the growing interest of Chinese enterprises to invest abroad but also 
because of the huge trade deficit that needs to be narrowed. A new chapter in bilateral 
relations was opened in December 2011, when Poland became the eighth strategic 
partner of China in the EU. Later, in April 2012 during his visit to Poland at the First 
CEEC-China Summit, the Chinese prime minister officially launched a cooperation plan 
with CEE countries called “Warsaw initiative”. The plan includes 16 countries in the 
region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, The Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Poland and Hungary.  The "2nd Regional Forum, Poland - China" was held in Guangzhou 
in June 2014. 150 local government officials, scholars and entrepreneurs attended the 
conference promoting tourism, trade and investment.24 China is opening new trade 
routes, which is important for increasing trade volume with Poland. The Chengdu-Łodź 
direct cargo rail link (crossing Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus) was launched in 2013. 
So far the Chengdu-Łodź connection is used only to import products from China and 
trains return almost “empty” to Chengdu (Szczudlik-Tatar, J., 2014). 
In the Czech Republic, ties with many Asian countries went through a substantial shift 
during the period 2000-2013. Although there is no strategic document focusing directly 
on Asia, Czech companies together with the Czech government are trying to decrease the 
dependency of the Czech economy on the EU market and this effort is mostly focused on 
BRICS and Asian countries (Križ, 2013). The “Export strategy 2012-2020” has set 12 
                                                 
23 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/prospects_for_polish_companies_expanding_into_japan?channel=www 
 
24 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/864825.shtml 
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priority countries, among them China. (Czech political relations with China were among 
the coldest in the whole of Europe. The current left-wing coalition perceives China as 
one of the top future economic priorities and recently declared a “restart” of Czech-
Chinese relations.) In August 2014 a two-day Chinese Investment Forum was held in 
Prague attended by over 500 Chinese and 700 Czech and other European delegates. “The 
development of cooperation with China is a priority of the Czech government”, said the 
attending Czech Prime Minister and emphasized the necessity of a direct air link 
between Prague and a major Chinese destination. The Chinese deputy Prime Minister 
stressed China's will to cooperate with all of Central and Eastern Europe, especially in 
construction of infrastructure (roads, railways and ports), and its interest  in importing  
Central European technologies.25 
The Czech government has good relations with Japan and South Korea. Czech-
Japanese science and technology days are regularly organised. In 2014 new large Korean 
investments were announced and high profile meetings took place.26 The Czech Republic 
is the only Central European country with a direct air link to the Republic of Korea. 
A look into major documents of Slovak foreign policy reveals an interesting feature: 
more recent documents seem to pay less attention to China than somewhat older 
documents. In a 2010 document it is written that “the foreign policy activities of Slovakia 
in Asia will be oriented toward strengthening economic and political dialogue with the 
most important countries of the region – China, Japan, India and the Republic of 
Korea27”. But for instance, the recent mid-term strategy of foreign policy until 201528 
does not mention China or Asia in general at all, and instead the document presents a 
                                                 
25 http://www.ansa.it/nuova_europa/en/news/sections/news/2014/08/29/great-investment-forum-in-
prague-to-attract-chinese-business_c694ca79-e8af-470c-b919-28d99f9d10c7.html 
26 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea met on 16 July, 2014 and 
discussed ways to raise the partnership between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea to a 
strategic level and opportunities for further broadening the cooperation, including the areas of energy, 
science and modern technologies. 
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/x2014_07_16_minister_zaoralek_met_foreign_minister_of_r
epublic_of_korea.html 
 
27 Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2010. 
http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_78DED0BDDD8B3A35C1257706002D8E9
C_EN/$File/Zameranie_2010_fin_EN.pdf 
 
28https://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_D9D5A743A2CE0A4FC12578950037A688_SK/
$File/strategia%20ZP%20SR.pdf 
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rather ‘traditional’ European and Atlantic approach. Similarly, there is only one single 
and indirect mention of China in the government  program declaration of 201229 as part 
of developing economic diplomacy towards Russia and other BRICS countries. The 
declaration of foreign policy direction for the year 201430 mentions EU-China strategic 
partnership; proposes the possible development of relations with China in the platform 
of the V4 and mentions the possibility of utilizing Chinese economic potential. In 2014 a 
ministry level meeting took place in Beijing (Turcsányi, 2014).31 A European-Chinese 
business centre was also built in Slovakia, to help Chinese businesses (Szikorova, 2012). 
The most pronounced and the earliest official government strategy towards Asia can 
be found in Hungary. The global crisis has opened a new and more intensive phase in 
Hungarian-East Asian relations. Several organizations have been established and a new 
foreign economic policy has been launched with special emphasis on the so-called 
“Eastern opening”. This new foreign economic strategy was approved by the 
government in the spring of 2012. The government would like to maintain Hungary’s 
strong and important economic relations with Western industrial countries, while 
simultaneously diversifying Hungary’s foreign economic relations and developing 
Eastern (or Asian) relations. Rapidly growing Asian countries are considered as ones 
able to provide several business opportunities and China is considered as an alternative 
source of external financing. 
In the field of export development, the foreign economic strategy puts forward an 
active state intervention to diversify Hungary’s export markets and structure, and also 
to develop the export capability of small domestic companies. 
The foreign economic strategy aims at geographical diversification of export. The 
Hungarian policymakers would like to have Hungarian companies benefit from the rapid 
                                                 
29https://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_D79B776034EEB158C12577850041BCAC_SK/
$File/120511_programove_vyhlasenie_vlady_zahranicna_politika.pdf 
 
30https://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CCDA4C778C8470ADC1257C7F0048B977_SK/
$File/Zameranie%20zahrani%C4%8Dnej%20a%20eur%C3%B3pskej%20politiky%20Slovenskej%20rep
ubliky%20na%20rok%202014.pdf 
 
31 On June 19, 2014, Chinese and Slovak directors of the Policy Planning Departments of the Foreign 
Ministries held consultation on foreign policies between the policy planning departments of the two 
Foreign Ministries of both countries in 
Beijing. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1168138.shtml 
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growth of Asian markets. The foreign economic strategy puts emphasis on developing 
trade (and technology) relations with China, India, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, ASEAN 
member states, Arab countries and the CIS. Developing indirect exports to Asian (or 
other emerging) markets means that Hungarian companies should become suppliers of 
big European (e.g. German, Austrian and Scandinavian) exporters with a strong position 
in emerging markets (Éltető-Völgyi, 2013). 
To enhance SMEs’entry into emerging (Asian) markets, the opening of state-owned 
trading houses32 took place. At the beginning of 2013, the state-owned National Trading 
House33 was established and  opened 29 trading houses by mid-2015 in several Asian 
countries like China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kazakhstan. Trading houses are intended 
to help Hungarian SMEs to sell their products abroad. In addition, the policymakers will 
also take possible cooperation with private trading houses into consideration.34 
The foreign economic strategy also recommends the development of economic 
diplomacy, e.g. the network of attachés for foreign economic relations and more aligned 
cooperation among export financing state banks, the Ministry of National Economy and 
the Trade and Investment Agency. Beside these institutions, we should pay attention to 
the growing importance of different chambers, committees and business forums in the 
framework of the “Eastern Opening”. Within the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, new (Chinese, Kazakh and Turkish) departments have been established. 
Reactivating the work of Joint Economic Committees (intergovernmental organisations) 
and the growing number of meetings of high-ranking politicians (in Asia or Hungary), as 
well as business forums underpin Hungary’s strong commitment to the ‘Eastern 
Opening.’ Invigorating Hungarian-Chinese economic relations traces back to 2003. Since 
then, there have been several annual meetings of high-ranking politicians either in 
Hungary or China. These events have had an important effect on Chinese-Hungarian 
trade. 
                                                 
32 By creating trading houses, the government would like to help Hungarian companies that lack capital 
with its knowledge of foreign trade and foreign markets to enable these companies to enter new emerging 
markets. In export development, trading houses will function as integrators between Hungarian SMEs and 
foreign buyers.  
33 http://www.tradehouse.hu/index.php?mid=450  
34 In December 2012, Széchenyi Bank opened a trading house in Baku, Azerbaijan. QUAESTOR, a financial 
consultancy company is planning to establish a trading house in Moscow, Russia. 
- 23 - 
Andrea Éltető, Ágnes Szunomár / Ties of Visegrád countries with East Asia –  
trade and investment 
 
 
In 2004, the Hungarian consulate in Shanghai was reopened and in 2010, a new 
consulate was opened in Chongqing. Some vocational organisations, e.g. ChinaCham 
Hungary (Hungarian-Chinese Economic Chamber), and the Chinese-Hungarian Business 
Committee have been established recently to intensify bilateral business relations. In 
addition, Hungary has the opportunity, together with other CEECs, to develop economic 
relations with China in a multilateral forum. The first China-CEE Economic and Trade 
Forum was held in Budapest, in June 2011. After that, the first meeting of the leaders of 
China and those of the CEE countries was organised in Warsaw, in April 2012. The 
Secretariat of China-Central Eastern Europe Cooperation was established within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and the first meeting of national co-ordinators was 
held in Beijing, in September 2012. The cooperation among China and CEECs includes 
trade, investments, infrastructural development and building of technology and 
industrial parks, etc. 
The Hungarian policy presented above not only concentrates on developing trade, but 
also on attracting FDI from emerging (Asian) countries. Earlier, Hungary had strong ties 
with Japan but mutual trade has decreased constantly.35 Besides ‘old’ Asian investor 
partners (e.g. Japan, South Korea), China is considered to be an investor with growing 
importance for Hungary. The export of Hungarian technologies (e.g. agriculture and 
water management) can also play a significant role in developing economic relations 
with emerging (Asian) countries. 
Interestingly, despite the deliberate steps, only minor amounts of fresh Chinese 
investment have arrived to Hungary after the announcement of the Eastern Opening 
Policy, big investment projects - similar to the investment of Wanhua or Huawei – are 
still awaited. This setback is partly due to the Eurozone crisis and partly due to some 
loss of trust in business circles. In spite of the strong, high-level support from both 
Budapest and Beijing, businessmen have not found real major opportunities. The reason 
behind this was probably the diverging economic interest of the two sides. Hungary 
                                                 
35 In the electronics industry, several Japanese companies (e.g. Sunarrow, TDK, Sony and Sanshin) recently 
closed their subsidiaries in Hungary. The Suzuki car factory’s annual production has decreased from a 
300,000 peak in 2006 to 170-180,000 units for today. The global crisis, the strong yen and possibly the 
use of alternative sources of supplies (planting Japanese production units to China) have caused a 
negative tendency in Hungary’s imports from Japan (Éltető-Völgyi, 2013). 
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would gladly receive Chinese greenfield investment and cheap if not free financial 
support. Meanwhile the Chinese are interested in infrastructure investment through 
public procurement and in providing credit lines which are not compatible with EU 
regulations. (Szunomár-Völgyi-Matura, 2014 p 22). 
Finally, it should be mentioned that recently interest in Chinese economic policy has 
also increased in the region. In April 2012 China opened a ten billion dollar credit line 
for Chinese investment in the CEE.  A Business Forum was launched and a Secretariat for 
China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation was established (Jacoby, 2014). 
Furthermore, it seems that Chinese leaders are determined to implement the “New Silk 
Road” strategy and have included Central and Eastern Europe in it (Szczudlik-Tatar, J., 
2014). At the second CEEC-China Summit in Bucharest, 2013, China suggested closer 
cooperation in the transport and infrastructure sectors, which may facilitate economic 
cooperation. In the joint CEE16–China declaration released after the summit, both sides 
declared the intention to construct international railway transport connections and 
establish preferential economic areas along them that may facilitate trade. At the third 
CEEC-China summit in Belgrade in 2014, the Chinese prime minister highlighted capital 
projects and investment in infrastructure as the most important forms of cooperation 
between the CEE region and China. 
These events already show that growing Chinese interest and the channelling of this 
interest into official ways will probably further intensify policy steps on the other, 
Visegrád side too. 
 
Summary, future prospects 
Having examined the Visegrád-East Asian economic ties, we can conclude that while 
Japan and South Korea previously had larger roles, recently China is pushing forward. 
Partly a deliberate policy from the Chinese side and partly the fact of increasing trade 
relations justify this trend. 
Our paper showed that the Visegrád region is not homogeneous and that there are 
differences in the economic relations between Visegrád countries and East Asia too. It is 
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also obvious that trade and foreign direct investment are intensely linked. In this respect 
we can speak about three “models”. 
One is the model of Slovakia, which is built on the automotive industry. As we have 
seen, Slovakian export to East Asia is extremely concentrated on cars. This has partly 
specific reasons (like the substitution of Japanese luxury cars with Slovakian produced 
ones in China) and partly general reasons: Slovakian car export is high to everywhere. 
(Currently, the auto industry accounts for 25 percent of Slovakian exports, one third of 
the country’s industrial production and a quarter of its GDP.) However, as Fidrmuc et al., 
(2013) conclude, this Slovakian trade pattern that concentrates on motor vehicle 
exports can be vulnerable. Up until now successful export-led growth strategy has been 
built on mobile industries which could move in quickly, but could also leave easily. Apart 
from that, the automotive sector is largely  vulnerable to  changes in demand. (Kia in 
2013 produced less vehicles compared to 2012. In order to eliminate overcapacity, the 
Renault/PSA factory in Slovakia introduced reduced working hours in 2012. VW 
Slovakia also responded to the first decline in sales caused by the economic crisis with 
cuts to working hours and the laying off of temporary workers.36) 
In order to decrease vulnerability and increase stability, domestic value added should 
be increased and positions in global chains improved.37  
Another model is that of Poland, which is to a lesser extent included in global 
production networks. It is perhaps better to say that Poland is included on another level, 
being an important exporter of copper to East Asian firms of global chains. Poland has a 
larger internal market and its trade is less concentrated, with fewer high-tech products 
than that of the other V4 countries. 
A third model is exemplified by the Czech Republic and Hungary, both being strongly 
integrated to GVCs, also relying a lot on the automotive industry but in a more 
diversified way than Slovakia. They have relatively intensive trade relations with East 
                                                 
36 http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/10/auto-a10.html  
37 As Baláž (2013) writes: “When Volkswagen arrived in Slovakia twenty years ago, nearly 90 per cent of the 
components had to be imported from outside the country. Today, the auto industry still imports components 
that make up more than 60 per cent of the total cost of the vehicle. In most cases, however, these suppliers are 
the traditional foreign partners of multinational companies, and Slovak companies can break into those 
multinational networks only with great difficulty. What’s more, foreign suppliers established in Slovakia 
usually only manufacture their products here, while keeping the more refined, well-paid activities, such as 
design, financial services, research and development, at home.” 
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Asia. Japanese, Korean and Chinese capital favoured these economies (mainly Hungary) 
in the past decades. Hungary has a strategic policy towards Asia, and terms of relations 
are improving between the Czech Republic and China. It is to be expected that the 
economic relations of these two countries with East Asia will remain intensive or 
become stronger in the following years. 
Regarding the fact that the international crisis strengthened interest in both East 
Asian and V4 partners to cooperate, it is quite possible that in the future these three 
kinds of “models” and the bilateral relations will become more similar. 
As detailed above, most of the Visegrád governments lack a unified strategy towards 
East Asian countries with Hungary being the only exception. Visegrád countries might 
enhance their economic relations with East Asian countries by evolving focused 
strategies or policies towards the East Asian region. 
In order to attract more investment, governments should be able to offer more 
opportunities and incentives for potential investors while – for example in the case of 
China - authorities should also help the investors to familiarize with laws, regulations 
and business habits in the host country. Simultaneously, Visegrád societies should learn 
more about East Asia and East Asian business practices as business cultures are differ in 
many respects. 
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Annex 
Table A1: First five product groups in Visegrad-East Asia trade, 2013 
CZECH REP. IMP CZECH REP, EXP HUNGARY IMP HUNGARY EXP 
AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING 
MACHINES AND UNITS THEREOF. . 
19,87 ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR 
SWITCHING OR PROTECTING 
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS.. 
7,34 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT AND PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES .. 
44,88 INTERNAL COMBUSTION 
PISTON ENGINES AND PARTS  
20,65 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT AND PARTS  
14,76 BABY CARRIAGES, TOYS, GAMES 
AND SPORTING GOODS 
6,84 ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR 
SWITCHING OR PROTECTING 
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS  
5,18 MEASURING, CHECKING, 
ANALYSING AND CONTROLLING 
INSTRUMENTS  
8,07 
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES SUITABLE 
FOR USE WITH MACHINES WITHIN 
GROUPS 751 AND 752 
9,17 INTERNAL COMBUSTION 
PISTON ENGINES AND PARTS 
THEREOF 
5,23 PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
SUITABLE FOR USE WITH 
MACHINES  WITHING GROUPS 751 
AND 752 
4,60 AUTOMATIC DATA-
PROCESSING MACHINES AND 
UNITS THEREOF;  
7,96 
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF THE 
MOTOR VEHICLES OF GROUPS 722, 
781, 782 AND 783 
7,30 PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF 
THE MOTOR VEHICLES OF 
GROUPS 722, 781, 782 AND 783 
4,64 THERMIONIC, CATHODE VALVES 
AND TUBES  
4,51 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT, PARTS.. 
5,43 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND 
APPARATUS, N.E.S. 
3,04 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND 
APPARATUS, N.E.S. 
4,63 AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING 
MACHINES AND UNITS THEREOF;  
4,32 TRANSMISSION SHAFTS  AND 
CRANKS, GEARS  
4,49 
SLOVAKIA IMP SLOVAKIA EXP POLAND IMP POLAND EXP 
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS AND 
APPARATUS, N.E.S. 
19,96 MOTOR CARS AND OTHER 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
74,34 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT, AND PARTS, 
15,86 COPPER 16,62 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT, AND PARTS,  
14,78 OTHER MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT SPECIALIZED FOR 
PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES 
7,72 PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
SUITABLE FOR USE WITH 
MACHINES WITHIN GROUPS 751 
AND 752 
5,38 OTHER MEAT AND EDIBLE 
MEAT OFFAL.. 
8,07 
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF THE 
MOTOR VEHICLES OF GROUPS 722, 
781, 782 AND 783 
10,52 PUMPS AIR OR OTHER GAS 
COMPRESSORS AND FANS..  
 
2,05 AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING 
MACHINES AND UNITS THEREOF 
5,23 INTERNAL COMBUSTION 
PISTON ENGINES AND PARTS  
5,70 
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AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING 
MACHINES AND UNITS  
5,51 FURNITURE AND PARTS 
THEREOF;  
1,02 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND 
APPARATUS, N.E.S. 
4,71 SHIPS, BOATS  5,20 
THERMIONIC, COLD CATHODE OR 
PHOTO-CATHODE VALVES AND 
TUBES  
4,40 TRANSMISSION SHAFTS AND 
CRANKS,GEARS  
1,01 ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR 
SWITCHING OR PROTECTING 
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS  
3,18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT, AND PARTS… 
5,16 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat Comext data, SITC 3 digit 
 
